Abstract: This paper takes into account the dynamic feedback between government expenditures and output in a model that separates the effects of expected and unexpected government expenditures on output. We allow for standard determinants based on Solow's growth model, as well as financial globalization and trade openness measures for a sample of 56 industrial and emerging market economies over the 1970-2004 period. We find that unanticipated government expenditures have negative and significant effects on output growth, with higher effects in developed economies. Along with savings responses, we interpret these results based on how fiscal policy reacts to business cycles. Anticipated government expenditures have negative -but smaller effects -on output growth. These results are very robust to a recursive treatment of expectations, which reinforces the role of new information in an increasingly integrated world economy.
Introduction
This paper estimates a rational expectations model in the tradition of Barro (1977) to separate the effects of expected and unexpected government expenditures on output. We conduct a new econometric treatment of output growth over the years , which provides a fairly long time span of analysis. Our approach is initially based on the literature on growth empirics that use dynamic panels (e.g., Islam 1995) . We then propose a two-step approach consistent with the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006) where in the first step we identify the expected and unexpected components of government expenditures and then test if they have the same effect on output growth.
A reconsideration of how government size has an impact on economic growth is well deserved for several reasons. First, it is at the forefront of economic policy debate, including the way the US, for example, chose to fight the 2008-2009 economic crisis with expansionary fiscal policies (mostly through higher government deficits), coupled with loose monetary policy (driving the federal funds target rate to zero). Economists diverge on the effectiveness of these measures and the debate is ongoing. Fiscal policy is one area of attention, which under the Keynesian view argues for a sufficiently large multiplier effect of government purchases.
While US government calculations suggested a fiscal policy multiplier greater than one, Robert Barro strongly criticizes the use of a number around 1.5, stating that there are reasons to believe that the war-based 0.8 multiplier substantially overstates the multiplier that applies to peacetime government purchases.
1 Robert Barro also reports the estimation of a spending multiplier of around 0.4 within the same year and about 0.6 over 2 years.
2 Barro and Redlick (2011) provide detailed evidence for the US economy in the long-run. Ramey (2011) surveys the evidence on the government multiplier. She discusses the multiplier in the neoclassical model as positive or negative (depending on the extent of distortionary taxes), as well as the Keynesian case through the marginal propensity to consume. Since theoretical work gives a wide range of values for the multiplier, she advocates a "turn to the data to see if we can narrow the range" Ramey (2011: p. 676 ).
Research on other major economies illustrates mixed findings as well. Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) , for example, employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and find for the Euro area that government purchases of goods and services and compensations for public employees have small and short-lived expansionary effects on private consumption, while innovations in transfers to households show a slightly more sizeable and lasting effect. Afonso and Jalles (2011) report panel results for 108 countries from 1970 to 2008 using a growth 1 Robert Barro, Government Spending is no Free Lunch, The Wall Street Journal, Jan 22, 2009 . He makes the expectations channel clear: "There are reasons to believe that the war-based multiplier of 0.8 substantially overstates the multiplier that applies to peacetime government purchases. For one thing, people would expect the added wartime outlays to be partly temporary (so that consumer demand would not fall a lot). Second, the use of the military draft in wartime has a direct, coercive effect on total employment. Finally, the US economy was already growing rapidly after 1933 (aside from the 1938 recession), and it is probably unfair to ascribe all of the rapid GDP growth from 1941 to 1945 to the added military outlays. In any event, when I attempted to estimate directly the multiplier associated with peacetime government purchases, I got a number insignificantly different from zero." 2 Robert Barro, The Stimulus Evidence 1 Year On, The Wall Street Journal, Feb 23, 2010. model in which the results show a negative effect of government size on growth. For the European Union, in particular, member states faced a fiscal framework with sound fiscal policies within the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) guidelines put forward in 1997. They use three indices constructed by the European Commission (overall rule, expenditure, and budget balance indexes) based on surveys and find that these fiscal numerical rules improve GDP growth for these EU countries, while the government size proxy loses significance.
Second, it is clear that the size of government matters for growth, although the precise effect is difficult to determine. The positive effect of government activities on output depends in theory on the relative efficiency of the public sector. Perhaps the most well-known paper is Barro (1990) , who extends endogenousgrowth models to include tax-financed government services on production and assumes exogenous government actions. In his model variations in the share of productive government expenditures in GDP affect the growth and saving rates. Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) find strong empirical support for Barro (1990) 's endogenous growth model, in which taxation and public expenditure can affect the steady-state growth rate. Growth regressions in Mueller and Stratmann (2003 ) from 1960 to 1990 show that there is a positive association between government size and growth in low-income countries, where the government sectors tend to be small, and a negative relationship across high-income countries, where government sector has grown larger. Tagkalakis (2008) examines the effects of fiscal policy on consumption in recessions and expansions in a yearly panel of 19 OECD countries from 1970 to 2002 and finds that the effect of fiscal policy is more pronounced in countries characterized by a less developed consumer credit market. His explanation is through binding liquidity constraints. Barro (1991) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) find that the share of government consumption in GDP is inversely related to GDP growth, while Levine and Renelt (1992) report government consumption expenditures to GDP having a negative effect on GDP growth, but the results are not robust. A host of papers has assessed the role of government expenditures on growth. Different specifications include removing education and defense from government expenditures in Barro (1990) but most previous works in the cross-section tradition have demonstrated the fragile nature of the link between government expenditures on growth.
report a significant negative correlation in most recent studies: an increase in government size by 10% is associated with a 0.5%-1% lower annual growth rate. One of the problems that plagued earlier works is the possibility of reverse causation, in which the extent of economic growth could determine the size of government. As Bergh and Henrekson (2011: p. 12 ) put it: "In general, in times of economic downturn social expenditure provides stabilizers that automatically undermine the government's balanced budget. On the other hand, in boom years when growth rates are higher fewer people will be unemployed, and public expenditure shares will be lower. For this reason, a negative correlation between public expenditure and economic growth is to be expected in the short run. Finding a negative correlation is therefore no proof that high expenditure causes low growth."
Third, previous research on economic growth has outlined how productivity is enhanced by the extent of trade openness and/or integration to global capital markets. Edwards (1998) examines nine measures of trade policy in 93 countries on total factor productivity growth and found that more open countries experienced faster productivity growth. Edison et al. (2002) report estimations of international financial integration effects on economic growth per capita for 57 countries. Although they usually find positive growth effects on the capital flows measure, they show mixed results for government balances. For Mishkin (2009) opening to foreign capital directly increases access to capital, lowering its cost. See also the dynamic panels by Chang, Kaltani, and Loayza (2008) and Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2009) . Aizenman (2008) links financial with trade openness and documents highly significant positive association between changes in financial and trade openness in developing countries and Swaleheen (2011) relates the extent of the size of government with economic growth and shows a negative effect of corruption on the growth rate of real per capita income. 4 Fourth, most of the existing empirical estimates have assumed that government expenditures are entirely exogenous to economic growth. We relax this assumption in this paper, exploring the class of estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . Endogeneity has plagued past research on economic growth and Barro (1990, S121) mentions in a theoretical paper that "aside from problems of measuring public services and the rates of growth and saving, the empirical implementation of the model is complicated by the endogeneity of government." Perotti 4 The link between government size and openness has been extensively studied as well. Rodrik (1998) finds a positive relationship between trade openness and the size of government, and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) document a negative covariation of country size with trade openness and with the ratio of government expenditures to output. Ram (2009) uses 41-year panel data covering the period 1960-2000 for 154 countries to find support for the direct relationship in Rodrik (1998) , while Benarroch and Pandey (2008) find the opposite to Rodrik (1998). (1999) assumes exogenous government expenditures in his treatment of private consumption responding to fiscal shocks and to the state of the economy.
In this paper we reexamine the role of anticipated and unanticipated government purchases in economic growth. With the Solow (1956) model as a benchmark, the rate of population growth and the ratio of investment to output are the key determinants of economic growth. Capital flows from abroad and government expenditures can, however, provide additional channels to economic growth, as long as these affect the stock of capital and the savings rate, respectively. Recent research along these lines by Cabral (2011) and Mollick (2012) sheds light on this channel for a sample of developed and emerging market economies from 1986 to 2004 to capture the globalization years after GATT negotiations in late 1980s.
We find that unanticipated government expenditures have negative and significant effects on output growth. Anticipated government expenditures have negative -but almost negligible effects -on output growth. We also find that, in developed economies, the unanticipated output effects of government expenditures are much higher than in emerging markets. These results are very robust to a recursive treatment of expectations.
In contrast to Tagkalakis (2008) , who used as proxy for credit constraints the maximum ratio of the loan to the value of the house in housing mortgages for first time buyers in OECD economies, we verify the role of credit constrains distinguishing between developed and emerging market economies as did Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) : economies can be more or less open depending on the extent of financial (and trade) flows. This may complement the government-output channel in fiscal policy. It is natural to expect that developed and developing countries may have different causal mechanisms when exploring economic growth when both external flows and the government sector are present. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) use a calibrated neoclassical growth model and found that developing countries do not benefit greatly from international financial integration and Adam and Bevan (2005) report threshold effects of fiscal deficits on growth for a panel of 45 developing countries. This paper has four more sections. Section 2 introduces the data employed in this work; Section 3 contains the empirical methodologies and the dynamic panel data models used; Section 4 discusses the results; and Section 5 concludes the paper.
The data
The data set for this paper comes from a yearly panel including 56 countries for over 35 years, from 1970 to 2004 . Cabral and Mollick (2012 contain more detailed discussion of this dataset. The main source of data is the World Bank Development Indicators database and the data set on foreign assets compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . The variables in the data set are the Gross Domestic Product Y it for country i at year t, total population L it , government expenditures G it , investment I it , and three measures of globalization. The first is trade openness TO it , calculated as the sum of imports and exports, divided by Y it . The second and third measures follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . The second is international financial integration IFI it , calculated as the stock of external assets plus the stock of external liabilities, divided by Y it . The third is a financial integration measure based on portfolio equity and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stocks. It is calculated as the stock of portfolio equity assets plus the stock of portfolio equity liabilities plus the stock of direct investment assets plus the stock of direct investment liabilities, all divided by Y it . Openness measures vary considerably across countries: they are much higher for industrial economies if measured by capital flows and are about the same for emerging markets if measured by trade considerations.
The correlation coefficients between our three measures of globalization and the output per worker are mostly positive and on average larger for industrial economies. These are not shown in the table but can be summarized. There are weak negative correlations between G/Y and output growth, varying from -0.08 in emerging markets to -0.15 in industrial economies. Correlation between G/Y and I/Y is negative in industrial economies (-0.43) supportive of a large crowdingout and very weak (-0.02) for emerging markets. Finally, correlation coefficients between G/Y and our measures of openness are negative in industrial economies (except for 0.19 with TO) and close to zero throughout for emerging markets.
The within-countries sample averages of the main variables are presented in Table 1 , in which we divide the sample between developed and emerging economies according to the classification in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) , the series are not filtered. We decompose, however, government size into expected and unexpected components, thus adding misperceptions to growth determinants. Under the small open economy assumption, Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore (2011) show that desired savings (S , current account (CA) incurs a deficit, which can be offset by either higher trade surplus (TB) or higher capital account (KA) surplus. The financial globalization measures used in this paper take this offsetting factor of CA into account when government undertakes higher or lower deficits in response to the business cycle. While Perotti (1999) assumes exogenous government expenditures for simplification, we believe it is more interesting to allow government expenditures to be endogenous (in the feedback mechanism specified below) and respond to all new information available. Our results hold of course with simpler autoregressive processes for G.
The basic empirical models below build on Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)'s treatment of Solow (1956) . In this paper we modify this framework for anticipated and unanticipated government expenditures in the tradition of the rational expectations model by Barro (1977) , who showed that only unanticipated money has real effects on unemployment. In doing so, we briefly compare our strategy to two empirical works, who have identified unexpected government shocks differently. For instance, as for the identification of anticipated fiscal shocks within a VAR framework, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) draw two conclusions: "First, identifying and tracing the effects of anticipated fiscal shocks can be done within a VAR framework but requires stronger identification restrictions. These restrictions may be too strong. Second, under these identification restrictions, we find that allowing for anticipated fiscal policy does not alter substantially the results we have obtained so far, …, our impulse responses suggest only weak effects of anticipated tax changes on output, a result consistent, for example, with the findings by Poterba (1988) for the Reagan tax cuts." Blanchard and Perotti (2002: p. 1355 ). In the context of cross-section regressions over 1960 , Woo (2011 puts forward a fiscal policy volatility channel, in which excessive discretionary changes in fiscal policy take place for reasons other than smoothing out fluctuations or responding to macroeconomic conditions. He first estimates time series regressions for final government expenditures (for each country) as a function of real GDP and controls. The country-specific measure of discretionary spending policy volatility is the log of standard deviation of the residuals of this equation.
We propose below a way to separate expected from unexpected components of government expenditures in a completely different fashion than these VAR and two-step OLS procedures to fiscal policy. Initially our estimation of the main output growth equation follows the literature on growth empirics that use dynamic panel data methods (see, e.g., Islam 1995) . We then propose a two-step procedure where in the first step we estimate a government expenditures equation that follows the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006) . This first step serves to separate government expenditures into its expected and unexpected components. In the second step we reestimate the output growth equation by allowing the marginal effects of government expenditures on output to be different if the expenditures are expected or if they are shocks.
Output dynamics
The dynamic specification that captures the effect government expenditures on output is given by:
( 1) where y it is the logarithm of the real output per capita in country i at time t, g it is the logarithm of the ratio of government expenditures to GDP (g it = log (G it /Y it )), and X is a vector of controls that contains the logarithm of the investment-to-output ratio (s it = log (I it /Y it )), the rate of population growth (n it = ΔL it /L i,t-1 ), and any of our three measures of globalization (open it = IFI it , GEQ it , or TO it ). Our measures of globalization are the logarithm of assets related globalization (IFI it ), the logarithm of equity related globalization (GEQ it ), and the logarithm of trade openness (TO it ). η i is the time-invariant country-specific characteristic and ε it is the remainder stochastic term. Although the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not of direct interest, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering consistent estimates of the effect of government expenditures on output. The correlation between government expenditures and output may reflect a common driving force that arises from a dynamic adjustment process. Hence, to take into account that government expenditures during period t may be affected by previous levels of output and previous output shocks, we will treat g it first as weakly exogenous and then as endogenous in the estimation of Equation (1). 5 5 In an innovative approach to deal with the endogeneity of cyclicality of fiscal policy Svec and Kondo (2012) use the stringency of balance budget rules across US states as instruments in a cross-section growth regression. While in their case the US state level dataset extends until 2009, they limit the analysis to 1977-1997 due to changing variable definitions. In our dataset for countries of the world, there is a surprisingly lower level of (uniform) data availability for tax revenues, as can be checked at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS. This constraint implies that tax revenues data would only be available from 1990 onwards (and not for all countries studied herein), which prevents us from using tax revenues in the equation for government expenditures below.
That is, we allow for a dynamic feedback between government expenditures and output and obtain consistent estimates of the coefficient of interest by using the difference and system GMM estimators as proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . In addition, these estimators are specifically designed to deal with a predetermined (or endogenous) g it , and the joint endogeneity of y i,t-1 , s ti , and open it . We will treat the population growth rate as exogenous.
These estimators control for time-invariant country-specific characteristics, η i , and maintaining that the disturbances are serially uncorrelated g it is endogenous in the sense that it is correlated with ε it and earlier shocks, but uncorrelated with future shocks. That is, E(g is ε it ) = 0 for s < t and for all i, and E(g is ε it )≠0 for s ≥ t and for all i. Serially uncorrelated ε it means that the error term is an unexpected change in output and that previous unexpected changes cannot be used to predict future unexpected changes. Furthermore, weak exogeneity or endogeneity of g it is consistent with rational expectations models and does not restrict agents from adopting a forward-looking perspective about the evolution of any of the variables in the model with the exception of n it , of course, which is modeled as strictly exogenous.
If the value of the lagged dependent variable is close to 1, then we would have a high degree of persistence. Following recent Monte Carlo results by Hauk Jr. and Wacziarg (2009) showing that not only fixed effect but also difference GMM estimators overstate the speed of convergence (in growth regressions), we report the estimates under fixed effects and system GMM estimators.
Government expenditures dynamics
The dynamic output characterization of (1) does not require specifying any models for g it to obtain estimates of the parameters (α, β, θ). However, formalizing the feedback mechanism from output to government purchases serves two objectives. First, it can be used to show why g it needs to be treated as weakly exogenous or endogenous in the estimation of Equation (1). Second, characterizing the evolution of g it is useful to separate expenditures into expected and unexpected government expenditures. Our simplest specification of the feedback mechanism follows one of the characterizations in Bun and Kiviet (2006) and models government expenditures using:
Equation (2) indicates that the government decides expenditure levels at the beginning of the period based on the realization of last period's variables. When δ = 0, g it in (1) is strictly exogenous. When δ≠0, g it it should be modeled as endogenous or weakly exogenous and depends via y i,t-1 on all past disturbances; not just on ε it . As (2) suggests, government expenditures today can be affected by previous realizations of output. Moreover, Equation (1) indicates that output can be affected by previous realizations of the right-hand side variables. This feedback mechanism between output and government expenditures means that agents can behave dynamically. Weak exogeneity or endogeneity of g it only implies that government expenditure decisions today must be uncorrelated with future realizations of unexpected output shocks. This does not restrict the government or other agents from adopting a forward-looking perspective. Moreover, weak exogeneity and endogeneity are consistent with rational expectations models in which agents' beliefs would be equal to the true data-generating process. Under rational expectations, government sets expenditures according to Equation (2), while output evolves according to (1). However, agents may have their own subjective beliefs about the evolution of g it and y it , and not necessarily following (1) and (2). 7 Even if all agents have rational expectations, private information drives variance on when (and how much) governments spend. Notice that Equation (2) can be used to assess the cyclicality of fiscal policy, for example, as in Woo (2011), who uses time series data to estimate the responses of government expenditures to real GDP.
Output and the role of expectations
Equation (2) can be written to emphasize the existence of the two additive separable components of g it :
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected or anticipated component, while the second term is the unanticipated component of government expenditures. We can then rewrite (1) to identify the effect of each of these two components on output:
Note that (1) is a restricted version of Equation (4) It is interesting to note that Equation (1) follows the existing literature on growth empirics that use dynamic panels (e.g., Islam 1995) . This literature is concerned with explaining economic growth and it is largely motivated by the theoretical models in Solow (1956) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) . These models involve not only long-run growth but also short-run convergence towards steadystates. While Equation (1) is the typical economic growth equation with a longrun interpretation, Equation (4) also models short-term dynamics. This is the case because unanticipated government expenditures are, of course, short-run. Moreover, the intermediate step of estimating Equation (2) prior to estimation of Equation (4) can be interpreted as a filtering of g it . 9 While the most common use of filters is to calculate trends or detrend a variable, Equation (2) "filters" g it in the sense that it separates its expected and its unexpected components in a model that considers forward looking agents and it is consistent with rational expectations.
Recursive estimation of expectations
The two-step procedure just described assumes that agents know the parameters (ρ, δ, γ) when they form their expectations of g it . Equation (3) is estimated only once using the whole set of usable observations in the sample. However, even if agents know the true data-generating process when forming their expectations, 8 Equation (4) follows model 4 in Pagan (1984) and accounts for the estimation error associated with the first-step estimation, (g it -E[g it ]), explicitly by including it in the estimated equation. More recent implementations of Model 4 in Pagan appear in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Escobari (2012) . 9 Some panel studies (e.g., Furceri and Mourougane 2012) use the Kalman filter to obtain structural unemployment or univariate filters (such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter) to smooth variables. In this paper we follow Islam (1995) and we do not use those filters. at time t they do not know the future realizations of the variables that are actually being used if we estimate (ρ, δ, γ) only once. A more realistic approach is to condition the formation of expectations on the same information set agents have. Formally, (3) becomes
where
This last equation indicates that the information set at the end of period t-1, Ω i,t-1 , includes all previous realizations of the variables (including previous shocks), but does not include contemporaneous shocks. In addition, notice that the coefficients (ρ t , δ t , γ t ) are allowed to change over time because they are updated every period as additional new information becomes available. To reflect this process we construct E[g it ] and (g it -E[g it ]) using time-varying (ρ t , δ t , γ t ), that are obtained from a recursive estimation of (5); i.e., we estimate (5) every period using only the observations detailed in (6).
Estimation methodology and assumptions
In order to estimate Equations (1), (2) (only once and recursively), and (4), we use the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panel data models proposed in Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . These estimators are consistent with rational expectations models, include dynamics, and address the potential endogeneity of the regressors. To show the importance of the assumptions behind these estimators, consider the estimation of (2). Taking first differences eliminates the time-invariant countryspecific characteristics:
We need instruments to deal with the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. By construction Δu it is correlated with Δg i,t-1 , Δy i,t-1 , and ΔX i,t-1 . Under the assumptions that u it is not serially correlated and that y i,t-1 and X i,t-1 are predetermined, the difference GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment conditions:
Blundell and Bond (1998) point out a statistical shortcoming with this GMM difference estimator. If the variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences.
To avoid the imprecision associated with this estimator, we will use the system GMM estimator as proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This system estimator combines the regression in differences with the regression in levels. The instruments of the regression in levels are the lagged values of Δg i,t-1 , Δy i,t-1 , and ΔX i,t-1 . The validity of these instruments relies on the following additional assumption: The first differences of g i,t-1 , y i,t-1 , and X i,t-1 are uncorrelated with the time-invariant country-specific effect (v i ), but their levels may be correlated with v i . The additional moment conditions for the levels equations are:
Therefore, the system GMM uses moment conditions (8) through (13) to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of (ρ, δ, γ). 10 To address the validity of the instrument list we report the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions. Because we have a large number of time periods we are concerned that the Hansen test may be weakened due to the large instrument collection (see, e.g., Roodman 2009a). To avoid weakening the Hansen test we "collapse" the instrument list as suggested in Roodman (2009b: p. 107) . To test the hypothesis that the error term u it is not serially correlated we test whether Δu it is second-order serially correlated. This test is critical not only for the validity of one of the assumptions behind the estimator, but also for (g it -E[g it ]) in (4) to truly represent a shock. Serially uncorrelated u it means that (g it -E[g it ]) corresponds to an unexpected change in government expenditures, and that previous unexpected changes and previous realizations of the variables cannot be used to predict (g it -E[g it ]).
Results

Dynamic output equation
The results from the estimation of (1) are presented in Table 2 . For comparison purposes the first two columns report sets of estimates that assume strict exogeneity of all the right-hand side variables. The first column presents the Pooled OLS and the second the Within specification, which additionally controls for time-invariant country-specific characteristics. To relax the strict exogeneity assumption columns (3) and (4) present the two-step difference and the system GMM estimators respectively, which allow y i,t-1 , y i,t-2 , to be endogenous and g i,t-1 and s i,t-1 to be weakly exogenous (we continue treating the population growth n it as strictly exogenous). The difference estimator in column (3) uses moment conditions analogous to Equations (7), (8), and (9), while the system estimator in column (4) additionally uses moment conditions analogous to Equations (11), (12), and (13). The validity of these specifications is addressed with two tests. We include the second lag of the dependent variable to help comply with the assumption of no serial correlation of the estimators; in subsequent tables the second lag is also included in the estimations for the g it and y it equations for the same reason. Across all GMM specifications we observe that the high p-values in the second-order serial correlation test in Δε it provide strong support for the assumption that the errors ε it are not serially correlated. Moreover, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to test the overall validity of the instruments shows that, across all specifications, the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals is not rejected.
Notice that while the estimates on the first lagged dependent variable are consistently above one, the long-run effect (which is typically the focus on convergence literature) is obtained by summing the coefficients on all the lags of the dependent variable. In our case the sum is in most cases less than one. This is a concern because if the sum is greater than one then there is a unit root and the difference GMM estimator will not be able to identify the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables because lagged values of y it would be uncorrelated with its first differences. This is another reason why the system GMM is our preferred estimator, where the identification in this case would come from the levels equations (Equations 11-13).
Consistent with the Monte Carlo simulation results in Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) , the estimate on g it in the difference specification appears to be biased downwards. Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) find that the bias is large when the regressor is persistent, which we will see is the case for g it once The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specifica-
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
we estimate equation (2). Columns (6) through (8) consider our measures of globalization (open it = IFI it , GEQ it , or TO it ) and focuses on the system estimator that models g it and as potentially endogenous. 11 The estimates appear robust across all specifications; the exogenous component of government expenditures has a negative effect on output. The point estimate in column (5) indicates that a 1% increase in government expenditures to GDP decreases real income per capita by 0.081%. The sign of this coefficient is consistent with the cross-section studies by Barro (1991) and with Levine and Renelt (1992) , but the latter finds that the negative sign is not robust. The negative sign associated with g it is also in line with the dynamic panels by Mollick and Cabral (2011) and Cabral and Mollick (2012) . The estimates in Table 2 show that higher investment-to-output ratio leads to higher output and that the rate of population growth affects output negatively. According to column (5), a 1% increase in the investment-to-output ratio leads to an increase in real output per capita by 0.016%, while a 1% increase in the rate of population growth decreases real output per capita by 0.018%. Finally, from our measures of globalization, in columns (6) and (8) international financial integration and trade openness have negative effects on output.
Government expenditures
In order to separate the evolution of g it into its expected and unexpected components Table 3 reports the estimates of the feedback mechanism from output to government expenditures discussed in Equation (2). As in the output equation ,  Table 3 also reports the Pooled OLS and the Within estimates. All the GMM specifications pass both tests: the Hansen test for the overall validity of the instrument list and the serial correlation test. The latter also validates the use of (g it -E[g it ]) as the unexpected component of government expenditures, which cannot be predicted from previous realizations of variables and shocks. In this estimation of Equation (2) the population growth is treated as strictly exogenous, while the lagged output and lagged measures of openness are treated as predetermined. This is reasonable because all are lagged one period and it is consistent with the government deciding g it after observing government expenditures and the reali-11 To illustrate the difference between predetermined and endogenous consider the instrument list in the specification in column 4, where g it and s it are treated as weakly exogenous and n it is treated as strictly exogenous. Instruments for the first-differenced equations are Δn it , and the first and further lags of y i,t-1 , g it , and s it . The instruments in the levels equations are Δy i,t-1 , Δg it , and Δs it . Treating g it as potentially endogenous rather than predetermined invalidates g i,t-1 and Δg it as instruments. Hence, the instruments formed with g it have one additional lag when compared to the ones based on the predetermined g it . The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
zations of the other right-hand side variables. A predetermined (or weakly exogenous) y i,t-1 does not mean that governments are not forward looking. They may have their own beliefs about y it and the future evolution of output, which under rational expectations is given by Equation (1). The third column of Table 3 presents a simple panel second-order autoregressive model for g it with lagged output and lagged investment-to-output ratio, while the fourth column additionally includes lagged population growth n i,t-1 . Columns five through seven present the results using our different measures of openness. Columns five and six appear with a positive and statistically significant output effect on government expenditures. A statistically significant effect validates modeling g it as predetermined or endogenous in the estimation of Equation (1). There is some evidence that population growth impacts negatively government expenditures; the estimate in column 6 indicates that a 1% increase in the rate of population growth reduces the ratio of government expenditures to GDP by 0.004%. Our first two measures of globalization, assets related globalization and equity related globalization included in columns (5) and (6), respectively, show a negative effect of globalization on government expenditures. However, trade openness reported in column (7) shows a positive and statistically significant effect.
The functional form in the estimates in Table 3 follows directly from (2), which is consistent with the feedback mechanism in Bun and Kiviet (2006) and treats n i,t-1 as exogenous and the rest as predetermined. These specifications imply that government expenditures are set at the beginning of the period as in Tagkalakis (2008) and respond to last period's realizations of the right-hand side variables. An alternative assumption is to model government expenditures as jointly determined with the contemporaneous right-hand side variables. Different sets of estimates under this alternative assumption are presented in Table 4 . The previous results on Table 3 hold but now all globalization measures have negative effects: a higher level of globalization contributes to lower government size, all else constant.
Output, and expected and unexpected government expenditures
After estimating (2) we use these results to construct estimates of the expected evolution of government expenditures E[g it ] and unexpected government expen-
. Table 5 provides the results of the estimation of (4) using two different specifications to obtain E[g it ] and (g it -E[g it ]). Columns 1 through 4 use the feedback mechanism reported in column 7, Table 3 , while columns 5 through 8 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). for columns 1 through 4 are based on the estimates on column 7, Table 3 , for columns 5 through 8 are based on column 7, Table 4 . Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the GMM two-step estimates. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. a The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification).
b
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). use the specification in column 7, Table 4 . All of the columns in Table 5 pass both specification tests, the instrument lists are validated using the Hansen test, while the serial correlation test in the difference equation shows strong evidence that the errors are not second-order serially correlated. The results show that when separating the effect of g it on output in two (expected g it and unexpected g it ) the latter has a much larger negative effect on output. The effect of expected g it has about half the magnitude and it is negative in the first four columns and positive or not statistically significant in the last four columns. Column 1 indicates that a 1% unexpected increase in g it decreases output by 0.072%, while a 1% expected increase in g it decreases output by 0.034%. When additionally controlling for openness, the magnitude of the coefficients is about the same. The last row in Table 5 reports the p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that the effects of expected and unexpected g it on output are the same. The p-values of zero across all specifications provide strong evidence against the null. The rest of the estimates in this table are largely consistent with the ones in Table 2 , the ratio of investment to output has a positive effect and the population growth has a negative effect. Moreover, equity related globalization has a significant positive effect and trade openness has a negative effect.
To account for the possibility that economic agents may update their expectations formations in the form of the data-generating-process of g it over time as more information becomes available, we estimate the coefficients (ρ t , δ t , γ t ) to obtain estimates of E[g it ] and (g it -E[g it ]) recursively as specified in Equations (5) and (6). When implementing this more realistic estimation strategy we assume that the econometrician has the same information set as the agents when they form their expectations. In particular, we first estimate Equation (2) ]) are obtained recursively using the process just described. The results are very similar to the ones in Table 5 . All columns pass both specification tests and both components of g it have a negative and statistically significant effect on output. Moreover, the p-values in the last row indicate that the unexpected component of g it has a significantly larger effect on output than the expected component of g it .
The estimates in column 1, for example, indicate that the magnitude of the effect is about 40% larger when the expenditures are unexpected than when they are expected. A 1% unexpected increase in g it decreases output by 0.111%. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on expected and on unexpected g it are the same.
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Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 we can observe that the recursive treatment of expectations increases slightly the magnitude of the unexpected components in columns (1) to (4), while the expected component has now a negative and statistically significant effect across all specifications. The rest of the coefficients have the expected signs and are consistent with previous results, including the globalization measures. An additional set of estimates is reported in Table 7 , where the goal is to test for differences in the effects of unexpected g it on output between developed (22 economies) and emerging markets (34 economies). 12 The key result obtained previously holds: unexpected g it has a negative and larger effect on output than expected g it . Moreover, the negative effect of unexpected g it appears to be much larger for developed economics; however, this result is not robust to different specifications of the government equation. The indicator variable I DEV is equal to one if the country is developed and equal to zero otherwise. Hence, the co efficient on the interaction term (g it -E[g it ]) × I DEV captures the differential effect of the un expected g it on output. The estimates in column 5, for example, indicate that an unexpected 1% increase in g it leads to a decrease in output in emerging economies by 0.055%, but to a much larger decrease in developed economies, 0.213% (adding the coefficients of -0.055 and -0.158). Tagkalakis (2008) found that spending shocks have more pronounced effects in bad times in the case of the low loan-to-value group, which is evidence for the important role that fiscal policy plays in periods of economic distress in less financially developed economies. In our estimates of Table 7 unexpected government purchases have larger negative effects for developed economies in columns (5) to (8). We further regress g it on GDP growth and controls in an alternative specification to (2).
13 Table 8 contains this alternative and reports GDP growth-coefficients varying from -0.910 (with the trade openness measure) to -0.952 (with the IFI measure) for industrial economies. This suggests a relatively strong countercyclical response: as real GDP falls, fiscal policy appears to be very expansionary (either by increases in G or by tax cuts) in industrial economies. The same figures for emerging markets are as follows: real GDP growth-coefficients varying from -0.380 (with the trade openness measure) to -0.427 (with both financial globalization measures). In emerging markets, the two financial globalization measures Table 7 Output equation with recursive estimation of expectations: developed and emerging economies. the GMM two-step estimates. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. a
The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation (valid specification).
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification). The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on expected and on unexpected g it are the same.
( Table   7 Continued) The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals (valid specification).
Output growth and unexpected government expenditures 509 have a negative but small effect on G/Y. Higher openness implies lower government size, all else constant. This modification of the feedback Equation (2) to allow for real GDP growth suggests that fiscal policy does not respond as much to GDP growth in emerging markets, perhaps because of a longer lag between fiscal policy decisions and implementation by federal, state, and local governments in developing economies. Recent evidence along these lines, yet with an alternative theoretical framework than the one in this paper, is provided by Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011) for a study on debt sustainability for 15 industrial countries from 1978 to 2005 and 27 emerging markets from 1990 to 2005. Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011) document with system GMM the ability of industrial countries to go into debt when there is an economic downturn; on the other hand, emerging markets do not appear to be able to run deficits when there are downturns.
Concluding remarks
We model the dynamic feedback between government expenditures and output in a rational expectations model along the lines of Barro (1977) . Allowing agents to behave dynamically, we find that unexpected government expenditures affect output negatively and expected government expenditures have negative, yet smaller, effects. The GEQ measure of FDI and equity flows has a positive impact on output. When allowing agents to update their beliefs about the datagenerating process, we find that the positive output effects of globalization remain with the FDI and equity measure of financial globalization. The survey by Bergh and Henrekson (2011) on the size of government and economic growth suggests a signi ficant negative correlation in most recent studies: an increase in government size by 10% is associated with a 0.5%-1% lower annual economic growth rate. The results in this paper are much closer to the upper range of these figures. Overall, the negative effects found herein for 56 major economies of the world from 1970 to 2004 are consistent with Barro (2010) , who reports government spending multi pliers substantially less than one for the US experience. Ramey (2011) suggests a range of plausible estimates for the government multiplier in the case of a tempo rary increase in G that is deficit financed (not accompanied by an increase in taxes) to be probably from 0.8 to 1.5. Our estimates for a panel of countries from 1970 to 2004 are more in line with a lower than 1 magnitude for the multiplier.
We also provide evidence that the negative effect of unexpected government expenditures on output is much larger in developed economies. While Tagkalakis (2008) recently proposed a liquidity constraint channel, his analysis was confined to OECD economies. Giavazzi, Japelli, and Pagano (2000) compare OECD countries with a larger dataset of developing economies and find that national savings are more responsive to government consumption in the former ( coefficient of -0.735) than in the latter (-0.493). Byrne, Fiess, and MacDonald (2011) have also recently suggested by system GMM the ability of industrial countries to go into debt when there is an economic downturn; on the other hand, emer ging markets do not appear to be able to run deficits when there are downturns in the economy. Svec and Kondo (2012) find across US states that a more counter-cyclical primary deficit increases state's long-run average growth rate per capita. Together with the sensitivity of savings, our most likely explanation is that govern ment expenditures respond differently across the two groups of countries to the business cycles: as real GDP falls, fiscal policy is found to be expansionary in industrial economies. The same figures for emerging markets are much smaller, perhaps because of longer lags associated with fiscal policy actions. We take our results as evidence that fiscal policy does not respond as much to GDP growth in emerging markets.
